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MISGUIDED REGULATION OF
INTERCHANGE FEES: THE CONSUMER
IMPACT OF THE DURBIN AMENDMENT
Patrick C. McGinnis

I. INTRODUCTION

D

uring a famous episode of Seinfeld, Jerry performs a standup routine about how women prefer to make purchases with
checks. 1 In contrast, men seem to find checks unmanly, as they
are like, “A note from your mother that says, ‘I don’t have any
money, but if you contact these people, I’m sure they’ll stick up
for me.’” 2 This episode aired in 1990 and while this is simply a
humorous interpretation of an everyday event, it highlights a
period of transition from predominantly using checks for
purchases to debit cards. For consumers, debit cards limit
liability when a card is stolen, offer easy access to Automated
Teller Machines (“ATMs”) and points of sale, allow for more
efficient record keeping of transactions, and provide a safe
alternative to carrying large sums of cash. 3 In 2009, consumers
made almost thirty-eight billion debit card transactions in the
United States, accounting for 35% of all non-cash payments. 4
Debit cards have now surpassed checks as the most frequently
used method of payment. 5
However, unlike checks, debit card transactions generate
an interchange fee, which is paid by the merchant to the
Seinfeld: The Stake Out (NBC television broadcast May 31, 1990).
Id.
3
Mercator Advisory Group, The Durbin Amendment: Impact Analysis 5
(June
7,
2010),
available
at
http://www.mercatoradvisorygroup.com/images/durbin_analysis.pdf.
4
TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke, No. CIV 10-4149, 2011 WL 1578535, at
*2 (S.D. Apr. 25, 2011)(affirmed by TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke, 643 F.3d
1148 (8th Cir. 2011).
5
Id.
1
2
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cardholder’s issuing bank.6 In response to the soaring cost of
interchange fees, United States Senator Dick Durbin negotiated
the inclusion of an amendment in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. 7 Known as the
“Durbin Amendment,” this provision sought to ensure that “[t]he
amount of any interchange transaction fee that an issuer may
receive or charge with respect to an electronic debit transaction
shall be reasonable and proportional to the cost incurred by the
issuer with respect to the transaction.” 8 Senator Durbin contends
that this amendment will help regulate interchange fees, resulting
in lower prices for both consumers and merchants. 9
This Note examines the impact the implementation of the
Durbin Amendment has had on consumers thus far. It
demonstrates how reduced interchange fees have not led to
reduced prices for consumers and how the reduced revenues
collected by banks on debit card transactions have led to the
elimination of other consumer benefits. Part II provides
background on the development of debit cards and the use of
interchange fees. 10 Part III explains the evolution of the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and the
inclusion of the Durbin Amendment. 11 Part IV analyzes the
impact of the Durbin Amendment and the effect it has had on
consumers. 12 Finally, Part V examines the outlook for the Durbin
Amendment and its impact on consumers and the banking
industry going forward.13

Id. at 3.
Press Release, U.S. Senator Dick Durbin, Durbin, Local Business
Owners Call for Prompt Federal Reserve Action on Swipe Fee Regulations
(June
10,
2011),
available
at
http://durbin.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ID=31031ccd-2dc64045-886f-b7b5b02c1e26.
8
Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(a)(2) (2010) (Section
1075 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
amends the Electronic Fund Transfer Act to add a new Section 920).
9
Press Release, U.S. Senator Dick Durbin, Durbin: Lower Debit Card
Swipe Fees Good For Consumers (Sep. 30, 2011), available at
http://durbin.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/localnews?ID=717a4e2b-2958-460a9929-c30e7995c6fd.
10
See infra Part II.
11
See infra Part III.
12
See infra Part IV.
13
See infra Part V.
6
7
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II. RISE OF DEBIT CARDS AND INTERCHANGE FEES
This Note will first examine the fundamental aspects of
how debit cards work and how they have become the prominent
non-cash payment method within the United States. This section
first examines the creation of ATM cards and explains how debit
cards evolved from the development of ATM cards. Next, the
increased use of debit cards during the 1990s is chronicled to
highlight how debit cards have become so popular today. Finally,
this section analyzes interchange fees and their vital role within
debit card transactions.
A. General Descriptions of ATM Cards and Debit Cards
What unites ATM and debit card transactions is that both
deduct funds directly against the consumer’s bank account. 14
ATM and debit card transactions permit any bank to link its
customers with the customers of another bank worldwide to
transact business almost immediately. 15 While ATM and debit
cards may appear to serve the same function, there are
distinctions that make each of them unique.
An ATM card is used to withdraw cash from an
automated teller machine. 16 Consumers may use ATMs affiliated
with their bank to perform regular banking transactions or any
other ATM to withdraw money. 17 The consumer enters a
personal identification number (“PIN”) and the checking account
is accessed to determine if adequate funds are available. 18 If
adequate funds are found, the cash is dispensed to the
consumer. 19 Today, ATM cards generally serve the dual purpose
of both an ATM and debit card and can be used for either type of

Fumiko Hayashi et al., A Guide to the ATM and Debit Card Industry 5
(Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 2003), available at
http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/psr/BksJournArticles/ATMpaper.pdf.
15
Understanding
Interchange,
MASTERCARD
WORLDWIDE,
http://www.mastercard.com/us/company/en/whatwedo/interchange.html (last
visited Sep. 30, 2012).
16
Hayashi et al., supra note 14, at 5.
17
DAVID EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WITH PLASTIC: THE
DIGITAL REVOLUTION IN BUYING AND BORROWING 298 (1st ed. MIT Press
1999).
18
Hayashi et al., supra note 14, at 5.
19
Id.
14
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transaction. 20
Debit cards are used in transactions for the purchase of
goods or services. 21 When consumers use their debit cards to
make a purchase, they are required to either enter their PIN or
sign a receipt to verify their identity. 22 Next, an electronicauthorization request is sent from the merchant to the merchant’s
bank, which then forwards this request to the issuing bank.23 The
issuing bank checks the corresponding account for adequate
funds and sends a message authorizing or declining the
transaction. 24 The merchant is then reimbursed by the issuing
bank for the price of the transaction. 25
B. ATM Cards and the Development of Debit Cards
The first ATM in the United States was developed in
1969. 26 By the early 1970s, ATMs were capable of taking
deposits, transferring money between checking and savings
accounts, dispensing cash from a credit card, and accepting bill
payments. 27 Banks soon began establishing shared ATM
networks, and by 1977 the networks had online access to account
information. 28
Regional ATM networks then began recognizing that
ATM cards could provide a convenient payment method at
stores. 29 By the 1980s, supermarkets and other retailers began
testing point-of-sale (“POS”) debit systems. 30 Shortly thereafter,
merchants began installing PIN pad devices to process the POS
debit transactions. 31 However, during the 1980s the number of
POS debit transactions remained relatively modest. 32
Id.
Id.
22
Id.
23
TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke, No. CIV 10-4149, 2011 WL 1578535, at
*2 (S.D. Apr. 25, 2011)(affirmed by TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke, 643 F.3d
1148 (8th Cir. 2011).
24
Id.
25
Hayashi et al., supra note 14, at 5.
26
EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 17, at 298.
27
Hayashi et al., supra note 14, at 12.
28
Id. at 14.
29
EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 17, at 298.
30
Hayashi et al., supra note 14, at 14.
31
EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 17, at 298.
32
Hayashi et al., supra note 14, at 14.
20
21
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C. Growth of the Debit Card in the 1990’s and Beyond
Several factors led to the growth of debit card transactions
during the 1990s. First, ATM cards had become extremely
common. In 1990, over 200 million consumers had ATM cards
providing access to about 80,000 ATMs. 33 The ATM cards that
consumers already possessed provided a simple transition for
ATM networks seeking to expand to debit transactions. 34 Another
reason for the growth of debit card transactions was the
installation of PIN pads in retail stores across the country.
Merchants realized the advantage of installing PIN pads because
debit transactions offered a guaranteed payment, a proven
increase in sales, lower labor cost through reduced transaction
times, and the elimination of the risk of bad checks. 35 The
number of PIN pads in retail stores throughout the United States
increased almost tenfold from 53,000 in 1990 to 529,000 in 1995. 36
This number tripled to 1.7 million PIN pads by 1998 and
increased to over 6.6 million in 2009. 37
A third reason for this growth was that ATM networks
became increasingly interconnected. While only 14% of ATM
networks were shared networks in 1980, by 1990 nearly 94% of
networks were shared. 38 With 100% of networks being shared by
1996, POS debit transactions became much easier to implement. 39
Additionally, in 1990 an agreement was reached between Cirrus
and Plus, the two major ATM networks, which permitted ATM
owners to service customers from the other network without
incurring additional membership fees. 40 These developments
established a national network and assured universal access to
ATM services. 41 Aggressive marketing by banks to encourage the
use of debit cards and the emergence of Visa and MasterCard’s
off-line debit products, which do not require the use of a PIN,
further stimulated the environment for the growth of debit cards

33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41

EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 17, at 303.
Id. at 301.
Mercator Advisory Group, supra note 3.
EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 17, at 308-09.
Id. at 309.
Hayashi et al., supra note 14.
EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 17, at 306.
Hayashi et al., supra note 14.
Id.
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and debit card transactions. 42
Although debit card transactions were negligible in
relation to all non-cash payment methods at the start of the 1990s,
by 2000 over 11.6% of non-cash payments were made with debit
cards. 43 By the end of the 1990s, over 235 million debit cards were
in circulation in the United States. 44 Debit cards totaled over 509
million in 2009 with a purchase volume of over $1.4 trillion in
throughout the United States. 45 According to the 2009 Survey of
Consumer Payment Choice, debit cards are used for 29.3% of all
transactions and have become the most frequently used method
of payment, eclipsing cash, credit cards, and checks
individually.46
D. Understanding Interchange Fees
The increased use of debit cards has led to an explosion in
revenue collected by banks for what are known as interchange
fees. Interchange fees are small fees paid by the merchant’s
acquiring bank to the cardholder’s issuing bank for debit card
transactions. 47 After debit card transactions are authorized, the
issuing bank posts a charge for the transaction on the consumer’s
bank account and transfers the funds minus the interchange rate
to the acquiring bank. 48 The acquiring bank then posts the funds
minus the interchange rate to the merchant’s bank account. 49 The
revenue from interchange fees is divided amongst the issuing
Id.
Id.
44
U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States, Table
1188
(2012),
available
at
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s1187.pdf.
45
U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States, Table
1187
(2012),
available
at
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s1187.pdf.
46
Kevin Foster et al., The 2009 Survey of Consumer Payment Choice,
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Public Policy Discussion Paper No. 11-1
(April 2011).
47
Interchange: Facilitating Benefits to Cardholders, Merchants, and
Society,
MASTERCARD
WORLDWIDE,
http://www.mastercard.com/us/company/en/docs/Interchange_Benefits.pdf
(last visited Sep. 30, 2012).
48
TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke, No. CIV 10-4149, 2011 WL 1578535, at
*2 (S.D. Apr. 25, 2011)(affirmed by TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke, 643 F.3d
1148 (8th Cir. 2011).
49
Id.
42
43
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bank, the acquiring bank, and the network that supplies the card
swipe machine, while the merchants generally bear the cost. 50
Financial institutions contend that interchange fees serve
as “a critical tool to balance the benefits and costs of electronic
payments, and ensure that each participant pays their fair share
associated with processing and protecting payment card
transactions.” 51 Consumers also benefit from the resources
created by interchange fees through benefits such as the ability to
make secure worldwide payments in a fraction of a second.52
These fees totaled over $16.2 billion in 2009 with the average fee
of $0.44 per transaction. 53
The assignment of interchange fees for debit card
transactions has changed over time as banks debate which party
benefits most from the transaction. 54 The interchange fee initially
went from the issuing bank to the acquiring bank, but this is now
reversed. 55 Merchants have long argued that issuing banks should
simply pay acquiring banks because the issuing banks save
money on the transaction through reduced paper check
processing costs. 56 While merchants have largely been
unsuccessful at deferring the costs of these transactions to the
banks, the dynamics of the interchange arrangements changed
with the implementation of the Durbin Amendment. Now, banks
are no longer able to recoup the cost of debit card transactions
from merchants, so the cost is now being passed along to
consumers.

III. THE WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT AND THE OPPORTUNITY TO
REGULATE INTERCHANGE FEES
In order to fully understand the Durbin Amendment, it is
essential to understand the environment in which it was
50
Christopher Maag, Interchange Fees: The Billion Dollar Fight for
Control of Your Wallet, BUSINESS INSIDER (Mar. 18, 2011),
http://www.businessinsider.com/interchange-fees-the-billion-dollar-fight-forcontrol-of-your-wallet-2011-3.
51
MASTERCARD WORLDWIDE, supra note 47.
52
Id.
53
TCF National Bank, 2011 WL 1578535, at *3.
54
EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 17, at 307.
55
Id. at 306.
56
Id.
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developed and implemented. This section provides the historical
foundation of the financial crisis in the United States and the
creation of a climate ripe for new banking regulations. Next, the
Dodd-Frank Act will be explained to convey the framework
within which the Durbin Amendment was created. Finally, this
section will review the Durbin Amendment and its general
implications for debit card transactions.
A. Banking Regulation and the U.S. Financial Crisis
After the stock market crash of 1929 and the failure of
thousands of banks the United States government passed the
Banking Act of 1933. 57 Known as the Glass-Steagall Act, this
New Deal legislation sought to regulate banks by: 1) separating
commercial banks from investment banks in order to shield bank
account funds from risky investments and 2) creating the Federal
Depository Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to insure bank
deposits. 58 After a period of increasing financial industry
deregulation President Bill Clinton signed into law the Financial
Services Modernization Act in 1999. 59 This legislation repealed
many of the banking regulations of the Glass-Steagall Act,
including the separation of commercial banks from investment
banks. 60
Beginning in 2008, the United States underwent the worst
financial crisis since the Great Depression. 61 Many believed that a
major cause of this financial crisis had been the repeal of GlassSteagall and the deregulation of the banking industry. 62 At the
very least, financial instruments and new forms of financing
within the banking industry exacerbated the American financial
situation. 63 In response, many Americans called for a new

Glass-Steagall, Dodd-Frank and the Volker Rule: A Primer and
Resources,
BILLMOYERS.COM
(Mar.
16,
2012),
http://billmoyers.com/content/glass-steagall-dodd-frank-and-the-volcker-rulea-primer-and-resources [hereinafter Glass-Steagall].
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
David A. Skeel Jr., The New Financial Deal: Understanding the DoddFrank Act And its (Unintended) Consequences, U. of Penn., Inst. for Law &
Econ. Research Paper No. 10-21 (October 2010).
62
Glass-Steagall, supra note 57.
63
Skeel, supra note 61.
57
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regulation system that could deal with the intricacies of the
twenty-first century financial system. 64
B. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
In March 2009, the Department of the Treasury released
its framework for regulating the banking industry in its “Rules
for the Regulatory Road.” 65 The Treasury later released a more
detailed white paper that served as a template for the
congressional legislation that would later pass. 66 The House of
Representatives passed legislation proposed by Congressman
Barney Frank, Chairman of the Committee on Financial
Services, on December 11, 2009. 67 The Senate passed its own
version of this bill, proposed by Senator Christopher Dodd and
known as the Restoring American Financial Stability Act, on
May 20, 2010. 68 A congressional committee was then appointed to
work out the differences between the two bills. 69
On July 21, 2010, Congress passed and President Obama
signed into law the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”). 70 According to the
Act’s subtitle, the legislation intended to, “Promote the financial
stability of the United States by improving accountability and
transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to fail,’ to
protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect the
consumers from abusive financial practices, and for other
purposes.” 71 The act provides for the creation of up to 400 new
regulations and various new regulatory and watchdog agencies,
including the Financial Stability Oversight Council, the Office of
Financial Research, and the Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection. 72
Id.
Id.
66
David H. Carpenter, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act: Title X, The Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau, Congressional Research Service, 1 (July 21, 2010), available at
http://www.llsdc.org/attachments/files/313/CRS-R41338.pdf.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Skeel, supra note 61.
70
TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke, 643 F.3d 1158, 1161 (8th Cir. 2011).
71
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
72
Glass-Steagall, supra note 57.
64
65
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C. The Durbin Amendment
During the negotiations of the Dodd-Frank Act, Senator
Dick Durbin saw an opportunity to implement regulations
regarding bank fees on debit card transactions. According to
Senator Durbin, the current system provided for “virtually no
competition and no recourse for merchants exploited by the rate
structures and fees” from the payment card networks. 73 Senator
Durbin argued, “[m]ost retailers have no bargaining power when
it comes to how much they’re charged for the use of debit
cards. . .[which] leads to higher prices for consumers.” 74
Consequently, the Dodd-Frank Act included what is
commonly called the “Durbin Amendment.” Title X of the DoddFrank Act, also known as the Consumer Financial Protection
Act, specifically required the Federal Reserve Board to prescribe
rules on debit card interchange fees that ensure they are
“reasonable and proportional.” 75 As a result, the Federal Reserve
Board passed a rule on December 16, 2010 approving the
implementation of the Durbin Amendment in the Dodd-Frank
Act. 76 The Rule initially established a cap on interchange fees at
$0.12 per transaction for issuing banks that, together with their
affiliates, have assets of $10 billion or more. 77 Financial
institutions responded by strongly opposing and lobbying against
processing debit card payments at such a low rate. 78 TCF
Letter from Senator Richard J. Durbin, U.S. Senate, to Camden Fine,
President and CEO, Indep. Cmty. Bankers of Am., and Dan Mica, President
and CEO, Credit Union Nat’l Ass’n. (June 11, 2010), available at
http://durbin.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/pressreleases?ID=d9c42bd5-b9454bee-b025-55aab2fd586a.
74
Brandy Donaldson, Durbin: Lower Debit Card Swipe Fees Good for
Consumers, Moline Dispatch & Rock Island Argus (Sep. 30 2011), available at
http://durbin.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/localnews?ID=717a4e2b-2958-460a9929-c30e7995c6fd.
75
Carpenter, supra note 66.
76
Winston & Strawn LLP, Implementing the Durbin Amendment: What
Was
the
Fed
Thinking?,
1
(April
2011),
available
at
http://www.winston.com/siteFiles/Publications/FRB_04_04_11_Briefing.pdf.
77
Press Release, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Dec.
16,
2010),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20101216a.htm.
78
Herb Weisbaum, Farewell Debit Reward Cards: Banks, Credit Unions
Ax Programs In Anticipation of New “Swipe-fee” Rules, NBCNEWS.COM,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42459217/ns/businessconsumer_news/t/farewell-debit-reward-cards/#.UGxxFFHDu8A (last visited
73
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National Bank even filed a federal lawsuit against the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System claiming that the
proposed interchange rate was below their cost to provide debit
card services. 79 The Federal Reserve Board ultimately issued a
final ruling on June 29, 2011, capping debit interchange fees at
$0.21 plus 0.05% of the transaction, and an additional cent for
fraud prevention costs and eliminating the requirement that debit
cards be processed on only one network.80
Less controversial provisions of the Durbin Amendment
include a provision that allows merchants to set a $10 minimum
on credit card transactions and another provision that permits
merchants to provide discounts to consumers who use a specific
method of payment. 81 These regulations are expected to save
merchants an estimated $14-19 billion dollars a year in revenue
issuing banks normally collect on debit card transactions. 82 The
interchange fee regulations stemming from the Durbin
Amendment became effective October 1, 2011. 83

IV. CONSUMER IMPACT OF THE DURBIN AMENDMENT
Senator Durbin explained that the purpose of the Durbin
Amendment was to “help small businesses, merchants, and
consumers by providing relief from high interchange fees for
debit card transactions.” 84 Proponents of the amendment base the
benefit to consumers on the assumption that card issues will bear
the cost of the lost revenue from reduced fees and that merchants
will pass these savings onto consumers through lower prices. 85
Sep. 27, 2012).
79
TCF Nat’l Bank v. Bernanke, 643 F.3d 1158, 1162 (8th Cir. 2011).
80
Press Release, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (May
1,
2012),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20120501a.htm.
81
15 U.S.C. § 1693o-2(b)(2-3) (2010).
82
Gerri Detweiler, What the Debit Card Interchange Rules Mean For
Consumers, ABC NEWS (June 30, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/debitcard-interchange-rules-consumers/story?id=13967755#.UGx2YFHDu8A.
83
Press Release, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (May
1,
2012),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20120501a.htm.
84
156 Cong. Rec. S3695 (daily ed. May 13, 2010) (statement of Sen.
Richard Durbin).
85
David C. John, The Durbin Debit Card Interchange Fee Cap Hurts
Consumers, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (March 17, 2011), available at
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Highlighting its purpose to help consumers, the Durbin
Amendment was even included in the section of the Dodd-Frank
Act entitled the Consumer Financial Protection Act. 86 Despite its
apparent intentions, the Durbin Amendment has not necessarily
benefited consumers. This section will show that the
Amendment’s implementation unintentionally eliminated certain
benefits consumer’s received from using debit cards.
A. Merchant Savings Have Not Reduced Consumer Prices
There has been significant debate about whether
merchants will pass along the savings from reduced interchange
fees to consumers in the form of reduced prices or if they will
simply retain the savings as profit. 87 Advocates such as Travis
Plunkett with the Consumer Federation of America argue that
these excessive fees paid by merchants are eventually passed on
to consumers in the form of lower prices. 88 It logically follows that
a reduction in interchange fees paid by merchants should also
reduce prices on consumer goods.
In reality, a Federal Reserve Board study examining
countries implementing interchange fee regulations shows that
prices on consumer goods do not necessarily experience a
corresponding reduction as a result of increased fee regulation. 89
Moreover, reports discussing Australia’s reduction of interchange
fees in 2003 published by both the United States Government
Accountability Office and Charles River Associates International,
a business consulting firm, found no evidence that merchants’
savings were being passed along to the Australian consumers. 90
Data on consumer prices in the United States show that
the Durbin Amendment has caused similar effects. An
examination of the automobile gas industry provides further
proof of an interchange fee reduction failing to reduce consumer
prices. Gas retailers received over $1 billion in annual savings
due to reduced interchange fees. 91 While this should mean savings
http://report.heritage.org/wm3194.
86
Carpenter, supra note 66.
87
Winston & Strawn LLP, supra note 76.
88
Weisbaum, supra note 78.
89
Detweiler, supra note 82.
90
Id.
91
Gas Retailers Gained a $1 Billion Subsidy from Durbin Amendment,
With No Evidence of Lowering Gas Prices, BUSINESS WIRE (Apr. 16, 2012
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of roughly $0.03 per gallon, no savings have been passed on to
consumers. 92 This is especially disconcerting as debit cards
account for one third of all transactions and over half of non-cash
payments for gas retailers. 93 If retailers that receive such a
significant portion of their payments from debit cards are not
passing along the saving to consumers, it is likely most retailers
would refrain from doing so as well.
Retail marketing consultant Kevin Coupe indicated that
the Durbin Amendment would at least allow retailers to “hold the
line” against prices increases. 94 However, a study performed by
the Electronic Payment Coalition found that consumer prices one
year after the implementation of the Durbin Amendment actually
rose 1.5%. 95 The study examined prices at four major retailers
and found the prices on most products increased from September
2011 to September 2012. 96 However, as the study failed to hold
certain factors such as inflation constant, it is unclear the actual
effect the Durbin Amendment had on consumer prices. According
to the Consumer Price Index, from September 2011 to September
2012 there was an inflation rate of just under 2%. 97 Consequently,
it appears that retailers were unable to “hold the line” on
consumer prices and at most were able to stave off an additional
0.5% in price increases.
In addition to these major retailers, small business owners
were also forced to raise prices for consumers because of the
interchange regulations. Prior to the Durbin Amendment, small
business owners who sold low priced goods received a discount
12:00 PM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20120416006410/en/GasRetailers-Gained-1-Billion-Subsidy-Durbin.
92
Victor Nava & Anthony Randazzo, Durbin Swipe Fee Watch V: Gas
Retailers, REASON FOUNDATION BLOG (Apr. 23, 2012, 12:20 PM),
http://reason.org/blog/show/durbin-swipe-fee-watch-v-gas-retail.
93
BUSINESS WIRE, supra note 91.
94
Tim Parry, Merchants Prevail in Swipe Fee Reform Vote,
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from financial institutions on interchange fees for goods under
$10. 98 However, the banking industry has largely eliminated these
discounts in order to make up some of the lost revenue from the
overall caps on fees. 99 As a result, many businesses are raising
their prices on low-priced goods in order to cover these increased
interchange costs.
For example, Redbox, a company that operates movie
rental vending machines, raised their prices from $1 per movie
per day to $1.20 on October 31, 2011. 100 Redbox admits on their
company website that the increased cost is due to “rising
operational costs, including increased debit card fees.” 101
Beginning in January 2012, many vending machine operators
that accept credit and debit cards either raised prices or began
offering a $0.25 discount for customers who paid in cash. 102
Consequently, instead of consumers benefiting from lower prices,
the cap on interchange fees led to little difference with large
merchants and actually resulted in slight price increases from
small retailers.
B. Elimination of Debit Card Rewards Programs
Debit card rewards programs allow customers to earn
points for actions like spending, carrying high balances, and
making minimum deposits. 103 These points are then used by

98
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8.html?mod=WSJ_article_comments#articleTabs%3Darticle.
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.html.
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Freedman, Redbox Price Hike Angers Customers, MSN MONEY (Oct. 28,
2011,
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http://money.msn.com/saving-moneytips/post.aspx?post=8000d0de-d0e4-4ed8-955f-d16f7464c448.
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consumers to redeem merchandise, gift cards, or even cash. 104
Rewards programs are used by banks to encourage consumers to
use debit cards because these transactions are profitable for the
financial institutions. 105
Before the Durbin Amendment took effect on October 1,
2011, banks had already eliminated most rewards programs on
debit cards. 106 As early as March 2011, Wells Fargo, Sun Trust,
and JPMorgan Chase had announced that they would no longer
offer debit card rewards programs.107 PNC Bank quickly
followed in September of 2011, announcing that they would no
longer be offering customers free checking or debit rewards.108
Even USAA, a part co-operative serving primarily U.S. military
personnel, veterans, and their families, was forced to shut down
their rewards program. 109 USAA account holders consequently
lost an average of $84 per year due to the elimination of these
programs. 110 In this instance, the Durbin Amendment is taking
money directly out of consumers’ pockets.
C. New Fees on Consumer Bank Accounts
Jamie Dimon, the president and CEO of JPMorgan Chase,
compared how banks will respond to the Durbin Amendment to
how a restaurant would deal with a similar situation. He
explained that, “if you’re a restaurant and you cannot charge for
the soda, you’re going to charge [more] for the burger. Over time,
it will all be repriced into the business.” 111 This highlights how
increased costs on debit services and other banking transactions
Id.
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106
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is a foreseeable consequence of the Durbin Amendment. In other
countries that regulate interchange fees, consumers now pay
periodic account fees, checking account fees, and transactions
fees. 112 In response to the lost revenue, banks are often required to
alter their business model in order to keep up their profits. 113 The
Eighth Circuit even argued in TCF National Bank v. Bernanke
that the likelihood of increased debit card service fees is what
makes the Durbin Amendment legal and prevents it from serving
as a price control. 114 It is clear that increased fees on consumers
are not only likely, but they also appear to be necessary to ensure
the amendment’s legality.
According to a survey conducted by Bankrate.com, in
2012 only 39% of banks offered free checking, defined as
accounts with no minimum balance requirements and no
monthly fee. 115 This decreased from 45% in 2011, the year in
which the Durbin Amendment was implemented, and 76% at its
peak in 2009. 116 Rather, in 2012, the average monthly
maintenance fee for noninterest-bearing checking accounts rose
25% to a record high of $5.48. 117 However, some large banks,
such as Bank of America, originally announced plans to charge a
$5 monthly fee for debit card services which were previously
free. 118 Due to customer outcries, many banks abandoned these
plans. 119 Banks instead have raised amounts on existing fees, such
as on ATM machines, overdrafts, and checking accounts. 120
Examples of banks increasing fees include Sun Trust, the
th
11 largest bank in the United States, who raised charges on
overdrafts from $25 to $36 on August 24, 2012. 121 Sun Trust also
increased its minimum balance requirement to avoid a $7
monthly fee on checking accounts from $500 to $1,500. 122
Mercator Advisory Group, supra note 3.
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Similarly, Wells Fargo stopped offering free checking accounts
and now requires account balances to exceed $1500 each month
to avoid a $7 monthly fee and in December 2011 TD Bank
increased their fees on services like wire transfers and money
orders and instituted a $9 fee for consumers making more than
six withdrawals during a billing cycle. 123
Banks have also begun charging higher fees to use ATMs.
ATM fees charged by the institution that owns the ATM
increased 4% in 2012, along with an 11% increase in fees charged
by banks for out-of-network ATM withdrawals. 124 Overall, this
means an average fee of over $4 for out-of-network ATM
withdrawals for consumers. 125
In addition to the fees instituted by large banks, small
financial institutions have also been forced to increase banking
fees. As the Durbin Amendment causes a decline in the number of
debit card transactions, operating costs for small banks increase
per account and per transaction. 126 Thus, small banks will also be
forced to issue fees on consumers in order to support these
operations. 127
These checking fees predominantly affect consumers from
lower and moderate income levels, as wealthy consumers have
avoided the fees by easily maintaining minimum account
balances. 128 Industry experts estimate that up to 5% of consumers
will be forced out of the banking system as the costs of
maintaining a bank account increase to cover the reduction in
debit interchange. 129
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D. Reduced Access to Banking Services
One of the benefits of the growth of debit cards and the
banking industry has been increased bank branches, longer
branch hours, and more days of service. 130 Since the Durbin
Amendment, financial institutions have begun to cut back on
these banking services due to their decreased revenue. 131 In order
to cut costs, Bank of America eliminated 17,800 jobs through
September 30, 2012. 132 In September of 2011, the Texas-based
IBC Bank also closed fifty-five supermarket-based locations and
eliminated 500 jobs. 133 The loss of the bank branches and
banking employees means fewer banking services are being
offered. Overall, these lost banking services impair the quality of
banking provided to consumers.

V. OUTLOOK UNDER THE DURBIN AMENDMENT
Despite attempts by financial institutions and consumer
advocate groups to inform regulators of the detrimental effects of
the Durbin Amendment, the amendment was passed,
implemented, and upheld after being challenged in federal
court. 134 In light of the amendment’s staying power, this section
evaluates the effect that regulations on interchange fees will have
moving forward. First, the innovations consumers have
experienced within the banking industry will become less
profound. Furthermore, now that merchants have succeeded in
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regulating fees on debit cards, they will likely turn their attention
to interchange fees for credit cards. However, one benefit for
consumers may be an additional payment option on bills for
consumers. This section highlights these likely outcomes and how
they will affect consumers.
A. Limited Innovation in Banking Services
The U.S. financial services market has developed an
industry that provides proven benefits to consumers. Some of
these benefits include mobile banking, internet based services,
identity verification services, risk management, and consumer
education programs. 135 The revenues collected from interchange
fees are not merely profits for banks, but rather they fund many
of the programs and benefits consumers receive from banks. 136
The Durbin Amendment’s limitation on the revenue financial
institutions can collect on debit card transactions limits the
funding necessary to support innovation and investment in
network operations. 137 As a result, consumers will see less
innovation in areas such as risk management, security, loyalty
programs, product development, and user education due to the
limited capital available for investment. 138
For instance, funding by financial institutions for fraud
prevention and customer authentication is largely funded by
revenue from interchange fees. 139 Banks will be forced to either
pass the cost of forgery or fraud protection to the consumers or to
cut investment in developing technology in these areas. 140 A sign
of this stress was revealed in the 2012 Faces of Fraud Survey,
which found that only 11% of financial institutions indicated
being in compliance with federal regulations for security controls
in conformance with the Federal Financial Institutions
Examination Council Guidelines. 141 Whether banks pass the cost
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137
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of these programs along to consumers or simply decrease funding
for security and innovation, consumers are likely to feel the
effects.
B. Interchange Fees on Credit Cards
Like debit cards, credit card transactions require an
interchange fee to be paid by merchants. Two factors make it
likely that credit card interchange fees will be the next fees to be
regulated. First, interchange fees on credit cards, especially
rewards cards, are significantly higher than debit card fees. 142
Now that merchants have succeeded in lowering the costs of
debit card transactions, they are beginning to turn their resources
towards regulating credit card transaction fees. 143 In July of 2012,
a settlement was reached between retailers and Visa,
MasterCard, and a number of major banks over price-fixing
claims on credit card interchange fees. 144 Large merchant groups,
however, have begun to disavow the settlement as it limits legal
challenges that could be brought in the future. 145 As this
perspective accounts for the likelihood of future challenges to
transaction fees by merchants, it appears these groups also
believe that credit card regulations are the next challenge facing
the banking industry.
The second factor is that merchants are unable to
differentiate between payment methods when setting their prices,
which causes merchants to have to account for significant
interchange fees that come with credit card transactions when
setting their prices. 146 This may be a significant reason why
regulations on interchange fees for debit cards alone has not
reduced prices for consumers. Therefore, in order to succeed at
lowering prices for consumers, credit card interchange fees will
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also have to be regulated. Both of these factors highlight how the
Durbin Amendment has set the stage for future caps on credit
card transactions in addition to debit card caps.
C. Increased Options for Bill Payment Methods
While card payments account for over 72% of payments in
retail stores, only a small fraction of loan and bill payments are
made this way. 147 One possible benefit from the Durbin
Amendment may be that more companies will offer debit cards as
a payment method for loans and bills.148 With lower interchange
fees being charged to these companies and institutions, there is
more incentive to offer an additional payment option for the
convenience of consumers. While this small benefit does not
outweigh many of the negative effects of the Durbin Amendment,
it is important to realize that benefits will be realized.

VI. CONCLUSION
Senator Dick Durbin may have had the best intentions in
placing a cap on interchange fees charged in debit card
transactions, but the real life consequences turned out to be
largely negative. Consumers have been adversely affected, having
begun to lose many of their previous banking benefits. Financial
institutions have consistently argued that such regulations would
harm consumers, but regulators paid little attention, possibly
assuming their intentions were purely selfish. In reality, consumer
interests in relation to the banking industry and debit card
programs are largely in line with those of the banks.
After a year of life under the Durbin Amendment, it has
become obvious that consumers are not benefiting from the
amendment’s regulation and are in fact paying for or losing their
banking services. Studies examining prices within the gas and
retail industries and small businesses show that savings are not
being passed onto consumers and that prices are even increasing.
Meaning, the revenue merchants are saving on reduced
interchange fees are being retained rather than passed on to
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consumers.
Furthermore, due to reduced revenue from interchange
fees banks are eliminating some banking service or increasing
prices to retain them. For example, debit card rewards programs
and free checking accounts have been eliminated by many banks.
Other banks have kept these services, but introduced annual fees
on debit cards and monthly fees on checking accounts. Banks
have also been forced to lay off employees and close some branch
locations as a result of the reduced revenue.
Some of the benefits of interchange fee regulation,
however, may not be realized because higher interchange fees are
still permitted on credit cards. Therefore, the regulation of credit
card interchange fees may be where the Durbin Amendment is
taking the banking industry. Moreover, with reduced revenue the
banking industry may produce less innovation in products and
services in the foreseeable future.
The only way to correct the negative impact of capped
interchange fees on consumers is to repeal the Durbin
Amendment. While the implementation of interchange fee
regulation on credit cards may help to actually reduce consumer
prices, the elimination of credit card rewards and additional
banking services would counteract this benefit. Only the repeal of
the Durbin Amendment will return the quality of banking
services, rewards programs, and lower retail prices to consumers.

